

**Developing System-Based Leading Indicators for Proactive Risk Management in the
Chemical Processing Industry**

by

Ibrahim A. Khawaji

B.S., Chemical Engineering, Colorado School of Mines, 2001

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Signature of Author: _____

Engineering Systems Division
May 4, 2012

Certified by: _____

Nancy G. Leveson
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by: _____

Olivier de Weck
Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Chair, ESD Education Committee

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Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division on May 4th, 2012 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Engineering Systems

ABSTRACT

The chemical processing industry has faced challenges with achieving improvements in safety performance, and accidents continue to occur. When accidents occur, they usually have a confluence of multiple factors, suggesting that there are underlying complex systemic problems. Moreover, accident investigations often reveal that accidents were preventable and that many of the problems were known prior to those accidents, suggesting that there may have been early warning signs.

System-based analysis addresses systemic aspects and leading indicators enable the detection of ineffective controls and degradation of the system. Together, they could enable taking needed actions before an incident or a loss event. To develop process safety indicators, the chemical processing industry currently uses guidelines that are mainly based on the concepts of the “Swiss Cheese Model” and the “Accident Pyramid.” The current guidelines lack a systemic approach for developing process safety indicators; the guidelines view indicators as independent measures of the safety of a system (e.g. a failure of a barrier), which can be misleading because it would not identify ineffective controls, such as those associated with the migration of the system towards an unsafe state, or associated with interdependencies between barriers. Moreover, process safety indicators that are currently used in the chemical industry are more focused on lagging as opposed to leading indicators.

This main objective of this thesis is to develop a structured system-based method that can assist a hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization in developing system-based process safety leading indicators. Building on developed safety control structures and the associated safety constraints, the proposed method can be used to develop both technical and organizational leading indicators based on the controls, feedbacks, and process models, which, ultimately, can ensure that there is an effective control structure.

Thesis Supervisor: Nancy G. Leveson

Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	5
TABLE OF CONTENTS	7
LIST OF FIGURES	9
LIST OF TABLES	10
LIST OF ACRONYMS	11
1.0 INTRODUCTION	13
1.1 THE PROBLEM	13
1.2 BACKGROUND: TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY USED	14
1.3 RESEARCH GOAL AND HYPOTHESIS: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE DIFFERENTLY?	15
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH	15
2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW	16
2.1 SYSTEMS THEORY	16
2.1.1 Chemical Processes as Complex Engineering and Socio-Technical Systems	16
2.1.2 Systems Safety and Safety as a Control Problem	17
2.1.3 Control and Plant States	18
2.2 LEADING INDICATORS	21
2.3 TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY USED FOR DEVELOPING LEADING INDICATORS	23
2.3.1 UK HSE Guidance for Developing Process Safety Indicators; HSG254 (2006)	24
2.3.2 OECD Guidance on Developing Safety Performance Indicators (2008)	25
2.3.3 Center of Chemical Process Safety Guidance	26
2.3.4 API 754 “Process Safety Performance Indicators” (2010)	27
2.3.5 Shortcomings and Summary	28
3.0 SYSTEMS MODELING AND LEADING INDICATORS	31
3.1 ACCIDENT MODELS AND LEADING INDICATORS	31
3.1.1 Approaches to Accident Models	31
3.1.2 Introduction to STAMP	32
3.1.3 Safety Control and Leading Indicators	33
3.2 ADDRESSING THE SYSTEM DYNAMICS	34
3.2.1 Introduction to System Dynamics	34
3.2.2 Incorporating the System Dynamics	35
3.2.3 Feedback Loops	36
3.3 ACCIDENTS AND INEFFECTIVE CONTROL – CASE STUDY	40
3.3.1 Description of the System	40
3.3.2 System Hazards, Safety Constraints, and Risk Control	41
3.3.3 Control Structure	42
4.0 SYSTEM-BASED METHOD	48
4.1 OBJECTIVES	48
4.2 DEVELOPING A SYSTEM-BASED METHOD	50
4.2.1 Leading Indicators Goals	50

4.2.2	Achieving the Goals – Leading Indicators Development Process	51
4.2.3	Proposed Method	54
4.2.4	Description of the Method	57
4.3	APPLYING THE METHOD - EXAMPLE	60
5.0	SUMMARY, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION	67
5.1	SUMMARY	67
5.2	LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH	68
5.3	CONCLUSION	69
6.0	DEFINITIONS	71
	APPENDIX A – ACCIDENTS AND INEFFECTIVE CONTROL	73
	REFERENCES	78

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Traditional Risk Reduction Principle	18
Figure 2.2: Systems View of Controls to Reduce Risk	19
Figure 2.3: Risk Reduction Impact	19
Figure 2.4: Plant States: Modes of Operation and Control.....	20
Figure 2.5: Loss of Control Snapshot	21
Figure 2.6: Timeline for Developed Process Safety Performance Indicators Guidance used in the Process Industry	24
Figure 2.7: James T. Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model” and Christopher A. Hart’s “Spinning Disks Model”	28
Figure 2.8: H.W. Heinrich’s “Accident Pyramid”	29
Figure 3.1: Generic STAMP Control Structure	33
Figure 3.2: System Dynamics Loops	37
Figure 3.3: System Dynamics Model.....	38
Figure 3.4: Raffinate Splitter and the Blowdown Drum.....	40
Figure 3.5: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Operator	43
Figure 3.6: BP Texas City Incident – Ineffective Control	47
Figure 4.1: Process for Ensuring Effective Control.....	52
Figure 4.2: Leading Indicators Development Process (Engine)	52
Figure 4.3: Leading Indicators Development Method.....	56
Figure 4.4: Typical Separation Unit.....	60
Figure 4.5: Separation Unit Control Loop and Causal Factors of Inadequate Control.....	61
Figure 4.6: Developing Leading Indicators for the Separation Unit	63
Figure A1: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Maintenance and Inspection Staff	73
Figure A2: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Engineering Staff.....	75
Figure A3: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Line Managers	76

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Summary of the Guidelines for Developing Process Safety Indicators	30
Table 3.1: Mapping Safety Constraints to System Components	41
Table 3.2: Physical Controls for the Blowdown Drum.....	42
Table 3.3: Inadequate Control: Operator	43
Table 3.4: BP Texas City case study- Examples of ineffective controls that existed prior to the incident.....	44
Table 4.1: Goals for Leading Indicators	49
Table 4.2: Summary of how the goals for leading indicators can be achieved using the leading indicators development process “engine.”	53
Table 4.3: Leading Indicators for the Separation Unit	64
Table 4.4: Additional Leading Indicators for Monitoring Progress at the Facility Level	66
Table A1: Inadequate Control: Maintenance and Inspection Staff.....	74
Table A2: Inadequate Control: Engineering Staff	75
Table A3: Inadequate Control: Line Managers	76

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AICHE: American Institute of Chemical Engineers
API: American Petroleum Institute
BLEVE: Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
CCPS: Center of Chemical Process Safety
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency
HSE: Health and Safety Executive
LPG: Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LOC: Loss of Containment
LOD: Lines of Defense
NFPA: National Fire Protection Agency
NIOSH: National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NPRA: National Petroleum Refiners Association
OECD: Organization for Economic Coordination and Development
OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PRV: Pressure Relief Valve
PSM: Process Safety Management
RMP: Risk Management Plan
STAMP: Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
STPA: STAMP Based Process Hazard Analysis
VCE: Vapor Cloud Explosion

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The chemical processing industry has changed considerably over the past several decades, and has become more advanced and complex. Technology has focused on safer designs, companies have established operating procedures and safety management systems, and best practices are being shared between companies. To further enable and make standards and procedures more effective, companies have attempted to tackle cultural norms in an effort to promote healthier safety cultures, and, thus, improve safety performance. However, companies continue to struggle with achieving improvements in safety performance, and accidents continue to occur.

When accidents occur, they usually have a confluence of multiple factors, suggesting that there are underlying complex systemic problems. Moreover, accident investigations often reveal that accidents were preventable and that many of the problems were known prior to those accidents, suggesting that there may have been early warning signs.

System-based analysis addresses systemic aspects and process safety indicators enable the detection of ineffective controls and degradation of the system. Together, they could enable taking needed actions before an incident or a loss of containment event happens in a complex system. It is vital that process safety indicators focus on leading indicators rather than lagging ones. Lagging indicators measure incidents after they occur, while leading indicators are proactive and forward looking measures that can identify performance degradation or deterioration of the system prior to an incident. These indicators go hand-in-hand. However, this research is focused on leading indicators that enable proactive risk management. This Chapter discusses the problem, current techniques that are used, and what is proposed to be done differently to improve the process.

1.1 THE PROBLEM

Process safety indicators that are currently used in the chemical processing industry are more focused on lagging as opposed to leading indicators. There have been attempts in the industry to develop leading indicators, but these efforts have fallen short of addressing the systemic aspects that can enable the possibility of predicting potential incidents before they occur or detecting the

migration of a system to an unsafe state. Most companies have established risk management programs that are either reactive (lack a forward-looking approach), or fragmented (system-based models are not used). A risk management program and the associated decision-making can only be effective if it considers the system as a whole and its dynamics, and if it is proactive enough to enable early actions.

1.2 BACKGROUND: TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY USED

To develop process safety indicators, the chemical processing industry currently uses guidelines provided by government regulators or professional organizations such as the UK HSE, OECD, API and CCPS. These guidelines are mainly based on the concepts of the “Swiss Cheese Model” by James T. Reason and the “Accident Pyramid” by H. W. Heinrich. The current guidelines used by the industry lack a systemic approach for developing process safety indicators; the guidelines view indicators as independent measures of the safety of a system (e.g. a failure of a barrier), which can be misleading because it would not identify ineffective controls, such as those associated with the migration of the system towards an unsafe state, or associated with interdependencies between barriers.

There have been several attempts in the process industry to improve the way process safety leading indicators are developed to monitor and improve safety performance. Recently, the process industry collectively began to place a significant focus on process safety indicators, and redefined how indicators should be developed by issuing a series of guidelines. These guidelines lack the systems approach, particularly involving the following aspects:

- They lack a structured systematic framework that can systemically facilitate obtaining feedback on the state of the system during the different phases of the lifecycle or during the different states of operations.
- Although the new guidelines have clarified the differences between personal versus process safety indicators, as well as leading versus lagging indicators, there are still vague definitions of their application.
- Organizational aspects are covered by some of the guidelines, but not in a systematic way. Moreover, addressing interdependences of system components is not covered.

- Current guidelines rely on hazard identification techniques that consider only linear chains of events.
- The guidelines do not provide a framework for monitoring the performance of the system as a whole. They provide significant focus on individual indicators versus aggregate ones.

In summary, these guidelines do not provide a structured mechanism for developing process safety indicators that can proactively detect system performance degradation.

1.3 RESEARCH GOAL AND HYPOTHESIS: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE DIFFERENTLY?

The primary aim of this research thesis is to answer the following question: *“How can a hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization develop system-based process safety leading indicators for the purpose of systematically and proactively managing risk?”*

The objective of this research is to develop a method that can assist managers and decision-makers in proactively managing risk in their organizations by identifying better means for developing leading indicators that can monitor systemic factors and, thus, prevent incidents before they occur. A more systematic review that would enable a better understanding of the system, as well as the complex interactions within its subsystems, and external factors is needed to provide better risk management. The hypothesis used in this research is that STAMP-based modeling concepts can be used to achieve this objective. This provides for a better understanding of the system, helps in identifying better means for developing leading indicators, assists in monitoring a system’s status, and, thus, helps in making timely informed decisions to prevent accidents from occurring or to identify needs for safety improvements.

1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH

In order to answer the research question, this research involves reviewing the literature and current practices, defining gaps particularly in the use of a systems approach for developing leading indicators in the process industry, exploring means for building on safety control structures, and developing a system-based method that can be used to develop leading indicators to proactively manage risk.

2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This Chapter provides background information on some of the essential concepts that are related to systems theory, systems safety, and leading indicators. The latter part of the Chapter summarizes the findings from a literature review, which include descriptions of the current state of the techniques used, their new contributions, and their shortcomings particularly as they relate to the systems approach.

2.1 SYSTEMS THEORY

Systems theory is the “interdisciplinary study of systems in general, with the goal of elucidating principles that can be applied to all types of systems at all nesting levels in all fields of research [1].” Booton and Ramo defined systems engineering as the design of the whole rather than the individual parts. They state that the “systems engineer harmonizes optimally an ensemble of subsystems and components [2].”

Systems theory is based on non-linear events and dynamics as well as feedback or feed-forward control. It also includes cognitive, psychological, organizational, and social aspects. The systems approach involves defining goals, formulating the problem, developing objectives, developing alternatives, and selecting the best alternatives [3]. The concepts of systems theory and the implementation of systems engineering date back to the mid-1900s, with major applications of the associated concepts during the development of railroad systems and telephone systems, as well as applications in World War II [2].

2.1.1 Chemical Processes as Complex Engineering and Socio-Technical Systems

Leveson states that, “while abstractions and simplifications are useful in dealing with complex systems and problems, those that are counter to reality can hinder us from making forward progress [4].” Complex systems are different from traditional systems in that they involve a high level of automation, social aspects, and complex internal and external interactions. System engineering concepts based on reductionism, like those developed in earlier times, may not be appropriate for complex systems. This is due to the intersection of natural science and human

social systems, as was recognized by Bertalanffy in the General Systems Theory [5]. C. Perrow has described some attributes of socio-technical complex systems [6]:

- Large problem space
- Social interaction
- Heterogeneous perspectives
- Distributed nature
- Dynamic properties
- Hazards in operations
- Automation
- Uncertainty in the data

These attributes apply equally well to processing facilities in the chemical processing industry.

2.1.2 Systems Safety and Safety as a Control Problem

Checkland suggested that “systems thinking is founded upon two pairs of ideas, those of emergence and hierarchy, and communication and control [7].” Leveson also suggested that safety is an emergent system property and that safety should be treated as a control problem for complex systems [8]. Systems safety concepts extends to addressing complex interactions, and in complex systems, according to Leveson, analyzing the system can not only prevent similar accidents, but also other types of future accidents by evaluating dysfunctional interactions between system components [4]. Investigations of catastrophic incidents such as Longford, Piper Alpha, and BP Texas City have identified multiple systemic flaws and common safety culture weaknesses. “Process safety¹ incidents are rarely caused by a single catastrophic failure, but rather by multiple events or failures that coincide and collectively result in an incident [9].” Risk management efforts should not only focus on addressing previous accidents, because different interactions of the system and the social aspects may result in unforeseen inadequate control.

¹ The term “process safety” is used more widely than “system safety” in the chemical process industry. The process safety concept probably began in the early 19th century in a du Pont black powder plant [10]. However, this was a self-regulated effort on the part of du Pont, and regulations of the chemical process industry most likely began to be formalized following the 1974 Flixborough disaster. Since then, process safety technology has advanced and loss prevention principles have been formulated in an effort to prevent loss of containment of hazardous material. In the 1980s, the industry recognized that technology alone would not result in process safety improvements and that there is a need for process safety management. “The evolution of process safety from a purely technical issue to one that demanded management approaches was essential to continued process safety improvement [11].” Process safety has been addressed through prescriptive and performance based regulations. Regulations in the chemical processing industry vary from country to country and they are often a combination of prescriptive and performance-based regulations. In the U.S., regulations are largely prescriptive and partly performance-based with the introduction of OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) requirements in 1991 [12].

2.1.3 Control and Plant States

The traditional view of risk control or risk reduction strategies are based on a linear view of the barriers that are in place [13]. This begins with a certain risk level and layers of protection are added to reduce the level of risk, as seen in Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1: Traditional Risk Reduction Principle

(Adopted from IEC 61508 [14])

This traditional view relies heavily on the chain of events model. However, a systems view of risk reduction requires treating safety as a control problem. Controls can be physical, organizational, or social, as seen in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2: Systems View of Controls to Reduce Risk

Such controls can have varying degrees of impact on risk reduction. It can be argued that addressing systemic aspects can have a greater effect on risk reduction, while addressing specific physical or component failures may not be as effective. These effects on risk reduction are demonstrated in Figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3: Risk Reduction Impact

Accidents occur due to ineffective controls, including those that gradually develop over time and involve the combinations of smaller failures caused by people and failures of the physical equipment [15]. Processing plants gradually change their states from normal to emergency modes of operations, as illustrated in Figure 2.4.




Figure 2.4: Plant States: Modes of Operation and Control

It can begin to drift from normal operations and, if no controls are in place, it will begin drifting towards abnormal operations, subsequently followed by critical operations and, finally, an emergency situation where loss of containment hazards can occur. Safety controls prevent a system from moving towards an abnormal state. Moreover, controls can bring the system back to normal operations, which can vary depending on the state of the plant, from mitigation, prevention, control, or optimization.

Even for incidents that occur outside the chemical processing domain, socio-technical complex systems involved in major accidents often have similar causes associated with inadequate controls. At the different states from normal to abnormal, as well as from abnormal to

emergency modes of operations, ineffective controls can be found through the use of leading indicators. An example is shown in Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.5: Loss of Control Snapshot

2.2 LEADING INDICATORS

Leading indicators are “something that provides information that helps the user respond to changing circumstances and take actions to achieve desired outcomes or avoid unwanted outcomes [16].”

According to Hollnagel and Woods, “in order to be in control it is necessary to know what has happened (the past), what happens (the present) and what may happen (the future), as well as knowing what to do and having the required resources to do it [17].” There are different definitions for leading indicators that can be found in literature. Some definitions overlap with each other. In general, leading indicators can be referred to as measures that can be used to predict future performance. Kjellen defined them as “indicators that change before the actual risk level has changed or signs of changing vulnerabilities [18].” Building on this definition,

leading indicators will be defined for the purposes of this research, as measures that detect ineffective control well before the risk level increases. Moreover, the terms “metric” and “indicator” have been used interchangeably in many cases. This research thesis will use the term “metric” for the process of how an indicator is developed, and the term “indicator” for what needs to be measured.

The objective of developing leading indicators is to enable detecting ineffective controls early enough before an accident occurs. This requires implementing a set of performance goals, so that safety performance can be measured, monitored, and analyzed and corrective actions can be taken. This can be achieved by instituting a program for process safety indicators with its associated processes, conducting reviews periodically, evaluating and applying the required process adjustments and corrective actions. Leading indicators should be developed part of a continuous improvement program that has a component relating to developing and monitoring leading indicators.

2.3 TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY USED FOR DEVELOPING LEADING INDICATORS

Historically, there have been several attempts in the process industry to use process safety indicators to monitor and improve safety performance. Early attempts to develop process safety metrics guidance by the CCPS go back to the mid-1990's with the subsequent release of software tools for performance measurements. In 2000, the BP Grangemouth Major Incident Investigation report recommended that “companies should develop key performance indicators for major hazards and ensure that process safety performance is monitored [19].” That report highlighted key questions regarding the need for performance indicators for safety culture, leadership, employee participation, as well as more specific processes such as management of change. It also suggested that industries may have a false sense of safety performance due to their focus on managing personal safety rates rather than process safety.

In 2003, the Working Group on Chemical Accidents (WGCA), chaired by the U.S. EPA, has introduced “Guidance on Developing Safety Performance Indicators [20].” This was developed by using the best practices implemented by different organizations. This document was classified as an interim guidance report so that it could be tested in pilot programs. However, industry implementation of these recommendations and the associated guidelines was limited to some extent.

Only after the BP Texas City incident in 2005 did the process industry for the first time collectively begin to place a significant focus on process safety indicators and subsequently redefine how indicators should be developed. The Baker Panel Report recommended that “BP should develop, implement, maintain, and periodically update an integrated set of leading and lagging performance indicators for more effectively monitoring the process safety performance [21].” The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) issued a recommendation to develop “performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries to ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities, which should include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators [22].”

A series of documents and guidelines have been issued since then. The following timeline (in Figure 2.6) shows the release of key guidance documents that should pave the way forward for the implementation of process safety indicators and should influence their application in the process industry.




Figure 2.6: Timeline for Developed Process Safety Performance Indicators Guidance used in the Process Industry

To develop leading process safety indicators, the process industry currently uses guidelines primarily provided by UK HSE, OECD, API and CCPS. The following sections discuss some of the key documents used by the process industry, and provide some background information on the basis of these documents, their new contributions to the process industry, as well as the areas that they did not address.

2.3.1 UK HSE Guidance for Developing Process Safety Indicators; HSG254 (2006)

These guidelines were developed by the UK HSE and the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) in collaboration with the process industry [23]. It outlines a six-stage process: establish a team; develop the scope; identify risk controls; identify controls critical elements; collect data; and review the results.

The guidelines recommend starting by identifying “what can go wrong?” using traditional hazard identification techniques, followed by defining each Risk Control System (RCS) that control each of these hazards. In this document, each RCS represents a barrier based on the “Swiss-Cheese” model, which, if it fails, can give rise to an accident. Leading indicators are developed based on the barriers’ failures, i.e., “holes” that are discovered during reviews, while lagging indicators are developed based on “holes” that are discovered after an incident or near-miss occurring.

The main new contribution of this document was its focus on leading indicators. Although limited to some extent, it suggests using these indicators to provide early warnings against deterioration or degradation. Another key addition was introducing the “dual assurance” concept of leading and lagging indicators to ensure that safety controls were functioning as expected. It also introduced the concept of using a hierarchical approach, where lower level indicators would feed into higher level indicators in an organization with an emphasis on senior management involvement. The suggested hierarchal approach is limited to communicating information from an individual site level to higher levels in the organization using more generic indicators. They suggest that this can be achieved through indexing and weighting low level indicators into higher level indicators based on the importance of an individual site in the overall organization.

2.3.2 OECD Guidance on Developing Safety Performance Indicators (2008)

These guidelines were developed by the Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) Division of the OECD in collaboration with the process industry [24]. It outlines a seven-stage process: establish a team; identify key issues of concern; define lagging indicators; define leading indicators; identify risk controls; identify controls critical elements; collect data and report results; act on findings; and review performance and indicators. Unlike the UK HSE’s document, it provided more guidance on developing leading and lagging indicators. It also distinguishes ‘act on recommendations’ as a separate step.

The guidelines recommend starting by identifying critical potential hazards using, for example, Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), which could include “What-If” Analysis, Layers of Protection

Analysis, Checklist Reviews, Quantitative Risk Analysis, etc. This is followed by defining areas of concern, i.e. processes, procedures, etc. that are most critical to control risk. According to this document, failure of such risk controls would result in an accident. Indicators are, then, developed based on potential failures in the areas of concerns, or where there are ineffective barriers. For each area of concern, the document provides a predetermined list or a “menu” for potential lagging “outcome” or leading “activities” indicators. The lists are intended to support organizations in identifying which ones are of particular interest to them.

The main new contributions of this document were differentiating outcome indicators (lagging) from activities indicators (leading) along with additional details on their development. This document provided guidance for setting priorities and ranking indicators as an aid to monitoring and reducing the scope of indicators’ development. It suggests that prioritization can be achieved by assessing the potential consequences of failures of processes, procedures, etc. and the likelihood of that happening. The document also provided guidance for setting targets, monitoring policies’ performance, and safety management. It highlighted the importance of engaging the stakeholders and sharing knowledge within and outside a company as well as monitoring performance early in a project lifecycle (i.e., in R&D, standards development, design and inherent safety).

2.3.3 Center of Chemical Process Safety Guidance

The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), Center of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), issued a series of guidelines:

- Risk Based Process Safety (2007) [25]
- Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics (2008) [26]
- Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics (2010) [27]

The guidelines recommend categorization of indicators based on the “Accident Pyramid” and the selection of indicators based on the “Swiss-Cheese” model. It refers to other guidelines, e.g. HSG254, for identifying hazards and selecting indicators, and provides a list of suggested leading indicators that can be used, which are based on process safety elements and based on indicators’ lists provided by other organizations. The main new contributions of these guidelines

were that they highlighted the importance of communication and provided more guidance for developing metrics based on targeted audiences within and outside an organization, as well as the type of indicators to be reported and the frequency of reporting. They promoted the development of consensus metrics and knowledge sharing among companies, as well as promoting social interests, such as sustainability (reporting performance progress towards sustainability) and demands for public transparency. They also addressed the need for a performance-based safety management system.

2.3.4 API 754 “Process Safety Performance Indicators” (2010)

The guidelines were developed by the American Petroleum Institute. The purpose of this API is to identify process safety leading and lagging indicators in the refining and petrochemical industries [28]. Other personal safety and health safety indicators are not part of this recommended practice. This API provides a framework for measuring activity, status or performance that can be used to classify process safety indicators into four tiers of leading and lagging indicators.

The guidelines recommend identifying leading indicators based traditional Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and risk assessments to define what can go wrong?, what are the consequences?, what is the likelihood?, what are the most critical barriers?, etc. Alternatively, it recommends using incident investigation findings to identify barriers that contributed to the incident, or using what other have successfully used to develop leading indicators. The guidelines are based on the assumptions of the “Swiss-Cheese” model that incidents result from failures of the barriers, and it recommends categorization of indicators into tiers based on the “Accident Pyramid”. The document provides a set of leading indicators examples that can be used.

The main new contribution of this API is the tiering process for developing process safety indicators. For example, it defines Tier 1 and 2 indicators which are somewhat lagging and include, injury and/or fatality, fire or explosion, as well as flammable or toxic releases. On the other hand, Tier 3 and 4 indicators are more leading indicators that can be indicative of process safety system weaknesses that can lead to Tier 1 or Tier 2 incidents. Examples of Tier 3 and 4 are the number of training completed, inspections overdue, etc.

2.3.5 Shortcomings and Summary

The problems with these guidelines are that they are primarily based on the concepts of James T. Reason's "Swiss Cheese Model" and Christopher A. Hart's "Spinning Disks Model (Figure 2.7) [28]. These models assume linear chains of events in accidents and do not address the complex systemic causes of incidents. According to Reason in *Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents*, "major accidents result when a series of failings within several critical risk control systems materialize concurrently [15]."




Figure 2.7: James T. Reason's "Swiss Cheese Model" and Christopher A. Hart's "Spinning Disks Model"

(From API 754 [28])

Also, most of these guidelines are based on the H. W. Heinrich accident pyramid. For example, the latest API uses this pyramid and groups accidents depending on their impact, into four tiers, representing a continuum of process safety indicators, varying from leading to lagging. It starts with Tier 1 as the most lagging and ends with Tier 4 as the most leading (Figure 2.8). While this provides a logical differentiation between leading and lagging indicators and while it suggests that high impact incidents are associated with precursor low impact incidents, there is no proof that this pyramid applies to process safety or to complex systems.




Figure 2.8: H.W. Heinrich's "Accident Pyramid"

(From API 754 [28])

While the concept that preventing a loss of containment is proactive, and mitigating the loss is reactive, the concept still assumes linear chains of events. Because incidents occur when there are complex interactions among events, there is a need for a more systematic view to account for these nonlinear factors. In addition, these guidelines use risk and reliability as parts of their recommendations. Most of them suggest using the likelihood of failures to reduce the scope of development, which can be deceiving as this may result in overlooking low likelihood events.

The Heinrich proposal describes indicators as a continuum or time dependent, while the Swiss Cheese model suggests that lagging indicators precede harm and focuses on the functionalities of the safety barriers. Rather than discussing failures, near misses, incidents, or events, a complex sociotechnical system must be reviewed to determine whether or not it is functioning safely. Moreover, although some guidelines provide the means to address culture, policies, and management system, integration and providing for feedback is lacking. Also, there is vague guidance on how individual plants or different processing facilities in an organization should be treated. For example, they do not cover transportation risks and do not fully address industrial parks, as they suggest applying these concepts individually and not to a site as a whole.

To summarize, Table 2.1 lists the new contributions of the previously discussed guidelines that were developed for process safety indicators development in the process industry, as well as those areas that they did not fully address.

Table 2.1: Summary of the Guidelines for Developing Process Safety Indicators

Guidance	Main Difference/ Addition/ Contribution	Main Shortcomings
UK HSE “Step-by-Step Guide to Developing Process Safety Performance Indicators, HSG254”	The focus on leading indicators	Mainly based on the “Swiss Cheese Model”
	The introduction of the “dual assurance” concept The introduction of the concept of using a hierarchical approach and emphasis on senior management involvement	Mainly based on the concepts of the “Swiss Cheese Model” and the “Accident Pyramid”
OECD, “Guidance on Safety Performance Indicators”	The differentiation between outcome indicators (lagging) and activities indicators (leading)	System-based methods are not used
	It provides guidance in setting priorities, ranking indicators, and for setting targets	There is a lack of integrating indicators and providing feedback to the different lifecycle phases
	It highlights the importance of engaging stakeholders and sharing knowledge within and outside a company as well as monitoring performance early in a project lifecycle, i.e. in R&D, Standards Development, Design and Inherent safety	They suggest using likelihood to reduce the scope
CCPS, “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety,” “Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metric,” and “Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics”	It highlights the importance of communication, developing consensus metrics, and social aspects	They suggest using risk and reliability as part of their recommendations
	It addressed the need for a performance based safe management system	
API 754, “Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries”	The introduction of a tiering process of developing process safety indicators	Vague definition of the scope of application

3.0 SYSTEMS MODELING AND LEADING INDICATORS

3.1 ACCIDENT MODELS AND LEADING INDICATORS

3.1.1 Approaches to Accident Models

Because the goal of developing early warnings is to prevent accidents from occurring, it is important to understand how accidents develop. Leveson [8], [30], [31], Hollnagel [32], and Qureshi [33] have discussed different accident models and approaches to accident management. In general, accident causality models are grouped into two main categories: traditional and modern. Traditional accident models involve sequential, chain of events models. In contrast, modern models involve systematic analyses in which complex interactions and structural hierarchies in complex socio-technical systems are addressed.

Traditional sequential models were developed in the early 1940s by Heinrich [34] and later by Reason's proposed "Swiss Cheese" Model [15]. As discussed by Leveson, these models have limitations with regard to analyzing and understanding complex socio-technical systems [8], [30], [31]. Although they provide simple graphical representation for developing scenarios, they oversimplify causality and do not address interactions and complexities. Without addressing system complexity, leading indicators would not properly detect ineffective controls. By comparison, systemic models are intended to address the system as whole, rather than specific component failures or deviations. Therefore, system-based accident analyses are more appropriate to address system risk; accordingly, these were used in this research.

It is important that system-based models are used (i.e. STAMP, as in this research) to develop leading process safety indicators that are appropriate to address ineffective controls. This is important because most installations in the chemical processing industry are considered to be complex engineered systems involving internal and external interactions among physical equipment, people, and social aspects (discussed in Section 2.1.1). Leveson suggested that system-based models (i.e. STAMP) would address such complexities [8], [30], [31]. Also, catastrophic incidents in the chemical industry involve complex, multiple factors; there are frequently couplings between different systems components and decisions are made under certain operational pressures. The Piper Alpha and the BP Texas City incidents are notable

examples of how accidents occur as a result of multiple independent events stemming from system design flaws.

3.1.2 Introduction to STAMP

Safety is an emergent property of a system based on systems theory concepts and principles, as discussed in Section 2.1.2. This emergent property results from the enforcement of safety-related constraints on the behavior of the system components through design and operation [8]. Loss of containment in chemical processing complex socio-technical system results from inadequate controls or lack of safety control enforcement. Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is a systemic accident model. It can be considered a comprehensive model that addresses complex socio-technical systems, and with which proactive safety and risk management strategies can be developed. Unlike traditional accident models that address component failures and analyze accidents using the chain of events approach, STAMP treats safety as a safety control problem in which enforcement of system safety constraints involve physical, organizational, and/or social elements, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 [8].




Figure 3.1: Generic STAMP Control Structure

(Developed by Leveson [8])

Control structures are based on controls and feedback. Using STAMP, the higher level control components are analyzed to determine how the physical system controls might be violated. Feedback comes in the form of communications with the higher levels of the hierarchy. Feedback from physical systems derives from process parameter indicators, inspection test results, preventive maintenance, and so on. Feedback from the staff to the line and higher management levels, and to external bodies, drives from reports, data, etc.

3.1.3 Safety Control and Leading Indicators

To enable developing process safety leading indicators, safety needs to be addressed as a control problem. Systems and their subsystems interact in unwanted ways, which result in conditions of

inadequate control. It is important to identify these interactions and controls as a means to develop proactive process safety indicators. Charles Perrow illustrated how unplanned and tightly-coupled nonlinear complex interactions are characteristics that could make a socio-technical system susceptible to degradation, increased level of risk, and potential accidents [6]. He stressed the time-dependence of coupling (i.e. the criticality of how coupled non-linear events vary with the time available or slack time). In addition, it is necessary to establish indicator targets at the different levels of a hierarchy, operating windows or envelopes, where the system can operate safely.

Leading indicators can be developed by analyzing the safety controls at the different levels of the hierarchy. An approach that can be taken is that if system safety constraints are violated and inadequate controls results, then this would be an indication of system degradation that could lead to a loss. By using STAMP, the control theory concepts are addressed by defining the objectives/constraints, structure, functions/process, as well as the context in a holistic approach.

3.2 ADDRESSING THE SYSTEM DYNAMICS

STAMP-based modeling addresses the static safety control of the system, and does not address the dynamics involved. The dynamics of the system needs to be analyzed so that the different reinforcing pressures, feedbacks, expectations, etc. are incorporated to get a better understanding of the dynamics of ineffective control, and, thus, having better decision-making. This will help in evaluating what needs to be done for more proactive risk management, i.e. enabling early actions to take corrective actions. The objective is to determine possible decisions that could have a positive impact on the safety state of the system over time and to assess whether or not these decisions reinforce safety improvement efforts.

3.2.1 Introduction to System Dynamics

The system dynamics field was created by Jay Forrester, an MIT Professor, in the 1950s. System dynamics modeling is a tool that can help with understanding and evaluating complex systems, as it addresses the technical, organizational, and social aspects of systems. It also helps by assisting managers and decision makers in evaluating policies and their impacts over time. The model is based on the non-linear dynamics of systems, as well as on the feedback and

control concepts. Change, policy resistance, and response in a complex system can be analyzed in a system dynamics modeling [35].

In system dynamics, a system is modeled using flows, stocks, and causal loops. The system behavior and interactions (technical, organizational, and social), in addition to the associated non-linearities are addressed by reinforcing (positive) feedback loops and balancing (negative) feedback loops. The former results in positive reinforcing effects on the system's behavior, while the latter results in negative, counter effects. The system can be analyzed, understood, and explained by the behavior resulting from the interactions among these loops. "The most complex behaviors usually arise from the interactions (feedbacks) among the components of the system, not from the complexity of the components themselves [35]." Modeling can also incorporate delays, which can introduce instability in the behavior of a system.

3.2.2 Incorporating the System Dynamics

The system dynamics model can be developed by tying, linking and mapping its components to the developed STAMP control structure [36]. This can be achieved by navigating through the different levels of the control structure to develop input information, internal variables, and output information for each level, as well as interactions, information, feedback, and control across the defined boundaries.

The model can be developed further by building on earlier developed archetypes or models. There were a number of system dynamics modeling efforts, where reference modes, causal loop diagrams, etc. were developed for either analyzing actual accidents or for developing safety archetypes. They are based on conceptual understanding or theoretical foundations supported with findings from actual loss incidents, which is referred to by Goh et al. as "theorizing-to-practice" models [37]. Marais et al. provided a set of six system safety archetypes that could be used for modeling common system dynamics behaviors that could lead to accidents [38]. The archetypes developed by Marais et al. can be used to describe the qualitative nature of the complexity of interactions and feedback, and to get insight on the underlying structure and behavior of the system under study. Moreover, Rudolph and Repenning have studied organizational collapses by discussing and simulating how systems under control respond to

disturbances [39] through the use of system dynamics models. System dynamic modeling of actual accidents or archetype models of accidents also offer a great learning opportunity for modeling.

3.2.3 Feedback Loops

Feedback loops will influence whether or not system degradations would result in an increased level of facility risk. Using safety monitoring in addition to reporting proves that, given the same time allocation, hazards can be effectively controlled both in the long- and short-terms [40]. Based on this concept, two of the most important feedback loops that must be considered are:

Proactive Risk Reduction: This loop addresses taking corrective actions when there is an increase in the leading indicators. The ability to detect degradation can be accomplished by proactively detecting possible degradation of the system before an incident occurs. Therefore, this loop captures system degradation through the proactive risk reduction loop, which has the leading indicators feeding into it to detect degradation of the system or to detect an increased level of risk.

Incident Learning: This loop addresses taking corrective actions based on lessons learned from other incidents. Kletz highlighted that, for accidents in the chemical industry, there would be similar incidents that have occurred a number of times in an organization prior to that accident's occurrence [41]. The same conclusion was drawn by independent investigation reports of major accidents. The investigation report of the Piper Alpha disaster [42] and those for the BP Texas City Refinery accident in 2005 [21], [22] indicated that similar incidents had occurred, or that problems were known prior to the occurrence of those accidents. "BP Texas City lacked a reporting and learning culture. Reporting bad news was not encouraged and often Texas City managers did not effectively investigate incidents or take appropriate corrective action [21]." This suggests that incident learning could have been limited in those organizations. Cooke and Rohleder suggested that, in order to reduce accidents, an organization incident learning system is needed [43]. Therefore, using incident learning to prevent accidents could be used as a loop in the model.

Learning may not prevent all potential accidents, but it will uncover many of them and could provide more insights into the chemical process or system that is being managed. This loop complements the proactive risk reduction loop, as safety performance improvement could have some limitations as the system becomes more complex. Amalberti indicated that reporting could become less relevant for predicting major disasters in complex systems [44]. The two feedback loops can be demonstrated in the following graph (Figure 3.2).




Figure 3.2: System Dynamics Loops

These feedback loops can be integrated into a system dynamics model if developed based on the STAMP control structure. Figure 3.3 demonstrates incorporating these loops in the control of process excursions, integrity degradation, and overdue risk assessment.




Figure 3.3: System Dynamics Model

System degradations part of the structure of the model were broken down and grouped into process-related excursions, integrity-related degradation, and overdue risk assessments.

- Process excursions: corresponds to an increased level of risk due to demands and activations of alarms, safety instrumented systems, relief valves, etc.
- Integrity degradation: corresponds to an increased level of risk due to inspections found to be outside the limits, defective safety critical equipment, etc.
- Risk assessments: covers delays in engineering studies and reviews

These groups can, thus, be linked to the level of risk of the facility. They impact the system degradation and level of risk, which can be improved if actions are taken to address any deviations. Taking the necessary corrective actions, however, depends on the ability of the organization to detect and acknowledge the information provided by leading indicators to prevent degradations. This requires management commitment, and the organizational safety culture, which can be addressed by other loops.

3.3 ACCIDENTS AND INEFFECTIVE CONTROL – CASE STUDY

Accidents result from ineffective control. In this Section, the BP Texas City Incident will be used to demonstrate how ineffective control resulted in this incident. The data were obtained from the CSB and Baker Panel investigation reports [21], [22]. Some of this information was limited. However, for purposes of this demonstration, the available information is sufficient.

3.3.1 Description of the System

In this case, the system involved in the accident are the Raffinate Splitter and the Blowdown Drum (receives and quenches hydrocarbons from the Splitter relief systems, and vents vapor to the atmosphere), as shown in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4: Raffinate Splitter and the Blowdown Drum

(Reference: [22])

The incident occurred during a start-up of the Raffinate Splitter.

- The Splitter was 85% liquid filled at high temperature and pressure;
- The pressure in the Splitter continued to increase rapidly;
- The vapor and liquid were relieved through the relief valves, which were connected to the Blowdown Drum;
- The Blowdown Drum filled up quickly, and hydrocarbons were discharged from an overhead stack to the atmosphere;

- Liquids formed a pool on the ground;
- Vapors and aerosols/mist created a Vapor Cloud;
- The Vapor Cloud was ignited in a nearby congested area and was ignited, resulting in a Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE);
- Temporary trailers nearby were destroyed;
- People in or near the temporary trailers were injured or killed.

This processing unit was equipped with level and pressure controls, a shutdown system, and overpressure protection. Overfills or overpressures would result in relieving hydrocarbons through the relief valves, which are sent to the atmosphere in this case.

3.3.2 System Hazards, Safety Constraints, and Risk Control

In this case, the hazard can be defined as an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from the Blowdown Drum. Considering the following safety constraints:

- SC. 1: Control the process within its design pressure,
- SC. 2: Control the flow, accumulation, and level within the design limits, and
- SC. 3: Maintain the integrity of the vessel and its associated accessories within the targets,

Responsibilities can be mapped to system components, as shown in Table 3.1:

Table 3.1: Mapping Safety Constraints to System Components

Responsibility	System Component
SC1. Control the process within its design pressure	Physical System: Vessel: Vessel Mechanical Design Instrumentation: Level and pressure sensors, alarms, control system, shutdown system, and the relief valves
SC2. Control the flow, accumulation, and level within the design limits	Operator and Engineers
SC.3 Maintain the integrity of the vessel and its associated accessories within the targets	Maintenance Staff: Instrumentation technicians, electrical technicians, and mechanics Inspection Staff: Mechanical inspectors and instrumentation inspectors Engineers and Line Managers

The primary physical controls to prevent hazards from occurring are the level and pressure controls, alarms, shutdown system(s), and the relief valves. Loss could occur if these physical controls fail to function as expected. Some of the physical controls are listed in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Physical Controls for the Blowdown Drum

Detection Mean	Cause
Level and Pressure Indication	Level indicators both local and at the control room
High Level/Pressure Alarms	Requires action by the operator to reduce or shutdown inflow
Level/Pressure Control	Reducing or stopping inflow by means of automatic control
Emergency Shutdown System	An instrumented system (with final shutdown devices) that shutdown automatically and diverts excess flow to the relief/flare system
Overpressure Protection	Relief valves that opens when pressure/level increases sending hydrocarbons to the relief/flare system or the atmosphere if safe
Passive Systems	In case of overflow, dikes and containment shall be used to prevent liquids from traveling to other areas
Active Systems	Detection of gas will activate alarms, and fire detection will activate fire protection systems

3.3.3 Control Structure

The control structure consists of the controls that are intended to prevent hazards from occurring. By the dissection of BP's accident reports and from general knowledge of BP and the refining industry in general, specific STPA-based control loops and the associated inadequate controls can be developed for the following system components (controllers): operator, maintenance and inspection staff, engineering staff, and line manager.

A simplified specific STPA-based control loop for the operator is shown in Figure 3.5. Other control loops can be found in Appendix A.




Figure 3.5: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Operator

Inadequate controls that are associated with the developed control structure for the operator is shown in Table 3.3. Inadequate controls associated with other control loops can be found in Appendix A.

Table 3.3: Inadequate Control: Operator

Inadequate feedback	<p>SC1&2 will not be satisfied if an increasing trend in pressure/level readings of the vessel is not detected, or if the pressure/level readings exceed the design pressure/level envelop without detection. Inadequate feedback are:</p> <p>IC1. Unavailable data to detect pressure/level increases</p> <p>IC2. There are calibration flaws in the pressure/level sensors</p> <p>IC3. There are maintenance flaws in fixing faulty pressure/level sensors</p> <p>IC4. There are inspection flaws in inspecting the faulty sensors or measuring current working pressure of the vessel and its components</p>
Inadequate process	<p>SC1&2 will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model to address an increased pressure/level. Inadequate process model are:</p>

model	<p>IC5. Operational procedures have incorrect or missing pressure/level set points, particularly high and critical pressures/levels</p> <p>IC6. Previous increases of pressure/level that did not require taking actions, and did not result in any consequences</p> <p>IC7. Periodic reviews and updates of operational procedures are not conducted and the procedures do not address updated operational pressure/level envelopes</p> <p>IC8. Flaws in the automation system logic</p>
Inadequate control actions	<p>SC1&2 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there is a pressure/level increase. Inadequate control actions are:</p> <p>IC9. The controller fails to timely shutdown on high pressure/level</p> <p>IC10. The shutdown systems is dysfunctional</p> <p>IC11. The relief valves are under-designed, and/or the vessel is not designed to handle the increased pressure/level</p>

There are many indications that the above inadequate controls and those listed in Appendix A existed at BP Texas City Refinery prior the accident as summarized in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: BP Texas City case study- Examples of ineffective controls that existed prior to the incident

	Comprehensiveness of controls (i.e. covering all hazards)	Adequacy of controls (i.e. using the appropriate controls)	Functionality of controls (i.e. ensuring they are implemented and not degraded)	Adaptability of controls (i.e. controls address changes in the system)
Detect flaws (Feedback)	<p><u>Not detecting missing constraints:</u></p> <p>Hazards analysis overlooked some hazards (e.g. H2S hazards)</p> <p>Hazards analysis overlooked previous blowdown drum overflow incidents</p> <p>Decisions</p>	<p><u>Not detecting inadequate constraints:</u></p> <p>Used atmospheric venting instead of a closed system for the blowdown drum</p> <p>Used inadequate redundancy for level indication</p> <p>No waivers were used for the blowdown drum and stack as they did not meet</p>	<p><u>Not detecting degraded safety constraints:</u></p> <p>No data available for the operators to know about overfills</p> <p>The set-points were not known to operations. The optional procedures or training materials did not have these data</p>	<p><u>Not detecting changes impacting safety constraints:</u></p> <p>Introducing more people during startup was not evaluated</p> <p>Pressure Control Valve was chained with no MOC</p>

	overlooked process hazards	standards Internal standards allowed the location of the trailers close to process units	The startup procedure was not updated to include blowdown hazards (particularly with the previous events occurring)	Locating trailers went through the MOC and was approved despite the hazards
Define factors that resulted in the flaws (This can be achieved using CAST)	Cost pressures focused efforts on integrity issues and not process hazards Incident learning from previous incidents is limited and no formal lessons learned process Ineffective hazard analysis procedures	Cost pressures resulted in using less expensive options Standards were not validated Waiver process was not effective	Investigation process is not effective (only two of the eight serious blowdown drum incidents were investigated) Out of date procedure Ineffective startup procedure (started up with known problems) Poor inspection and maintenance at several facilities	MOC process was not used for all changes
Take corrective actions	No evidence of taking corrective actions related to the above flaws, particularly when they were not detected	No evidence of taking corrective actions related to the above flaws, particularly when they were not detected or believed to be adequate	There were many detected degradations with no evidence of taking corrective actions: There were many studies concluding integrity degradation and operating envelope risks There were many loss of containment events Actions relating to the blowdown system were not implemented. Management decided not to eliminate atmospheric blowdown systems Level transmitter repairs were deferred Overdue inspections (in many of BP's sites) Needed maintenance was not performed during turnarounds	No evidence of taking corrective actions related to the above flaws, particularly when they were not detected or not carefully reviewed
Monitor progress and effectiveness of the	<u>Process Safety Leading Indicators</u> Extent of detecting	<u>Process Safety Leading Indicators</u> Extent of detecting	<u>Process Safety Leading Indicators</u> Extent of implementing	<u>Process Safety Leading Indicators</u>

process (Feedback)	unidentified hazards, and reviews of the risk assessment process Extent of investigating factors leading to this	inadequate controls, and reviews of design standards process Extent of investigating factors leading to this	controls Extent of controls degradations Extent of reviews and updates of operating procedures Extent of investigating factors leading to this	Extent of changes in controls based on system changes Extent of reviews, implementation of the MOC process Extent of investigating factors leading to this
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In summary, for the BP Texas City Incident, ineffective control resulted from the following.

- Detection was not effective. There was ineffective detection of missing hazards, and repeated incidents were not considered when designing controls.
- Analysis was not effective. There were ineffective analyses of the flaws; some of the problems were known, but were not investigated or analyzed.
- Correcting flaws was not effective. There were ineffective interventions; some of the problems were known, but the company did not take the necessary actions to correct them.
- Monitoring was not effective. This was due to ineffective monitoring of the extent to which safety constraints were implemented, flaws that were found, how they were analyzed, and the extent to which corrective actions were taken. Having feedback (leading indicators) could have prevented this. These indicators could have been developed based on the above analysis for detecting flaws and monitoring progress.

Figure 3.6 demonstrates the ineffective controls at the BP Texas City Refinery Incident.




Figure 3.6: BP Texas City Incident – Ineffective Control

Therefore, this case study supports that accidents result from ineffective control. Leading indicators are needed to detect such ineffective control, so that incidents can be prevented (if the indicators were appropriately monitored and actions were taken).

4.0 SYSTEM-BASED METHOD

4.1 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this Chapter is to develop a method that can assist a hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization in developing system-based process safety leading indicators.

In this analysis it is assumed that organizations have already designed a good organizational control structure, and that hazards have been identified, and associated controls are in place, and that these organizations are continuing to look for ways to find weaknesses in their control structure in order to improve it. Even with a presumably good control structure, accidents continue to occur. This can be attributed to the following major reasons.

- During the design and development phase of a facility, some hazards may not have been identified and some risks may have been overlooked. There could also be design flaws resulting from applying inadequate technologies to control the risks, or resulting from using improper assumptions, such as assuming that certain scenarios are not likely to occur and excluding them from design considerations. Additionally, system hazards arising from complex system interactions may not have been fully understood or anticipated at this phase.
- During the construction and operational phases, hazard controls that have been designed may not have been implemented or may not have been implemented as intended. Also, implemented controls may become ineffective over time and safety constraints may be violated².
- During the operational phase, new risks arise due to either (1) changes within the system (physical or organizational), which could include complacency, personnel changes, etc., or (2) changes or influences from outside the system, which could include population encroachment, pressures from government agencies, etc.

Therefore, to ensure that there is an effective control structure, it is important to have the means to proactively correct flaws, uncover mistakes, and address changes in the control structure and

² Leveson highlighted that “not only must the assumptions and design rationale be conveyed to those who will operate the system, but there need to be safeguards against changes over time that violate those assumptions [31].”

changes in the environment before an accident occurs³. Incorporating effective leading indicators can be the means to achieve this. They can be used either to determine if the designed control structure works and addresses all hazards and changes, or to provide early warnings if the controls are not working as intended or have deteriorated over time and have become ineffective. Because systems could slowly move towards a state of higher risk, there should also be a feedback mechanism or indicators that can enable detecting this migration to allow for timely intervention. Table 4.1 summarizes what leading indicators should achieve.

Table 4.1: Goals for Leading Indicators

Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of the Control Structure	Goals for the Leading Indicators
Unidentified hazards	They should detect flaws in the hazard analysis conducted during the design and identify factors that caused overlooking hazards, or flawed analysis of identified hazards. Also, they should identify hazards that may be new because of changing environmental conditions.
Design flaws (e.g. applying inadequate technologies to control risks)	They should detect design flaws and flaws in the design process that resulted in applying inadequate controls.
Improper implementation of hazard controls	They should detect improper implementation of controls or lack of their implementation.
Controls deterioration over time and safety constraints violations	They should detect if the system is not being operated as designed or is being operated outside its operational envelop. Also, they should detect if safety constraints are violated. More importantly, they should detect these prior to exceeding the operational envelop and violating safety constraints.
Internal or external changes	They should detect if any change(s) is/are not adequately evaluated for safety, reviewed, approved, or implemented

There are additional benefits for having leading indicators, although they are not primary goals. They can facilitate internal and external communications, improve preparedness for events, and improve the management of other business aspects⁴. Relying on current guidelines for leading

³ Accident investigations often reveal that accidents could have been prevented as problems were known before those accidents occurred. For example, the 1997 incident at the Tosco Refinery in California could have been prevented if the temperature excursions occurred prior to the accident were investigated and controls were put in place [27].

⁴ “If you are not managing process safety well, you are probably not managing other things well [27]”

indicators or limiting feedback on accidents may not provide the insights that are needed to understand complex systems and prevent accidents before they occur.

4.2 DEVELOPING A SYSTEM-BASED METHOD

Identifying leading indicators starts with conducting hazard analysis, and developing safety constraints and high level requirements. Leveson highlighted that “detecting migration toward riskier behavior starts with identifying baseline requirements. The requirements follow from the hazard analysis [31].” She further states that “the identification of system safety constraints does provide the possibility of identifying leading indicators applicable to a specific system [31].”

It was previously assumed that organizations would already have designed a good organizational control structure, hazards were identified, and the associated controls were in place. Starting with the developed safety constraints, this section proposes a method that can be used to achieve the goals for leading indicators (stated in Section 4.1), and, ultimately, ensure that there is an effective control structure.

4.2.1 Leading Indicators Goals

By reviewing the goals for leading indicators listed in Table 4.1, they can be summarized and grouped into the following goals.

- Goal (G1): Ensure that controls are comprehensive (i.e. they cover all hazards). Safety constraints should address all risks.
- Goal (G2): Ensure that controls are adequate (i.e. appropriate controls are used). Safety constraints should use proper controls and technologies that are fit for the intended purpose.
- Goal (G3): Ensure controls’ functionality (i.e., controls are not degraded over time). Safety constraints must be implemented properly and continue to be valid and maintained at all times.
- Goal (G4): Ensure controls’ adaptability (i.e., controls address all changes occurring within or outside the system).

4.2.2 Achieving the Goals – Leading Indicators Development Process

To achieve these goals, there should be a process that can facilitate this. Each specific goal (stated in Table 4.1) requires detecting flaws. To ensure that there is an effective control structure, the process should also ensure the identification of factors resulting in the potential flaws, address the flaws at a system level, and monitor the progress. Therefore, the process should incorporate the following steps.

1. Detect flaws by collecting data. This can be achieved through risk assessments, audits, monitoring trends, etc. The collected data can be used as feedback and as leading indicators.
2. Identify those factors that resulted in the flaws through a formal analysis. This can be achieved using CAST⁵; the findings of this analysis feed into the next step.
3. Take corrective actions to address the flaws and update the process models. This can be achieved by implementing the recommendations from the previous step, and by ensuring they are addressed at the system level and not only at the subsystem analyzed.
4. Monitor progress and effectiveness of the process by collecting data. This can be achieved by collecting data that reflect the progress and effectiveness of the previous steps and the overall process. The collected data can be used as feedback and as leading indicators.

These steps are intended to ensure that there is effective control. Figure 4.1 illustrates how these steps can be achieved, and Figure 4.2 shows how they can be used to develop leading indicators.

⁵ Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) is a systematic approach to accident analysis. “CAST can be used to identify the questions that need to be answered to fully understand why the accident occurred [31].”




Figure 4.1: Process for Ensuring Effective Control




Figure 4.2: Leading Indicators Development Process (Engine)

As a result of applying the above process to each of the goals, leading indicators can be generated. Table 4.2 provides guidance and demonstrates how this can be achieved.

Table 4.2: Summary of how the goals for leading indicators can be achieved using the leading indicators development process “engine.”

Top row represents the different goals of the leading indicators. The following rows demonstrate how they can be achieved via the process (engine) steps shown in the left columns.

Cells highlighted in green can be considered as feedback (leading indicators).

	G1: Ensure comprehensiveness of controls (i.e. covering all hazards)	G2: Ensure adequacy of controls (i.e. using the appropriate controls)	G3: Ensure functionality of controls (i.e. ensuring they are implemented and not degraded)	G4: Ensure adaptability of controls (i.e. controls address changes in the system)
Detect flaws (Feedback)	Periodic validations and updates of risk assessments and the risk assessment process Periodic audits and reviews Reporting and analysis of incidents and cross-organizational learning	Periodic reviews and updates of design standards and their development process Periodic audits and reviews of the design process and organization Reporting and analysis of lessons learned from the design process and cross-projects learning	Continuous monitoring of data and trends related to operational envelopes and integrity windows Periodic audits and reviews of operations, and cultural surveys Periodic reviews and updates of operational, maintenance, and inspection procedures	Continuous monitoring of change authorizations, reviews, hazard analysis, and implementations Periodic reviews of the Management of Change (MOC) Process
Define factors that resulted in the flaws (This can be achieved using CAST)	<p>Defining factors that resulted in flaws being detected can be achieved by using proper tools like CAST. There could be many factors that result in such flaws, which could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited knowledge of the team working on risk analysis and designs, or reviewing changes. This can be attributed to many factors, including those related to training and competency • Bad judgments and decisions by staff or management due to, for instance, using probabilities or a cost benefit analysis as a basis for their decisions, or using inadequate judgments on the significance of physical changes, personnel changes, external changes, etc. • Lack of quality⁶ work processes or procedures (risk assessment processes, design processes, operational procedures, etc.) • Lack of data to monitor or too much data to monitor • Other factors including limited learning within the organization and resource limitations <p>Factors will vary from one organization to another depending on the detected flaws and the appropriateness of the tools used to find factors resulting in flaws. Because this step is part of the internal engine for developing leading indicators and not a source of feedback itself as discussed earlier, the overall investigation process can be monitored and not the specific factors found.</p>			
Take corrective	To address factors that result in flaws being detected, taking corrective actions is necessary not only within the specific subsystem where a flaw was found, but at the system level. Similar to the			

⁶ Quality process for the purpose of this research assumes that it follows the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) model

actions	previous step, corrective actions will vary from one organization to another depending on the detected flaws and the factors identified. Factors can include improving processes related to training, incident reporting and investigation, resource allocation, decision making process, standard developments and updates, risk assessment process, etc. Because this step is also part of the internal engine for developing leading indicators and not a source of feedback itself as discussed earlier, the overall implementation can be monitored and not the specific corrective actions needed.			
Monitor progress and effectiveness of the process (Feedback)	Extent of detecting unidentified hazards, and reviews of the risk assessment process	Extent of detecting inadequate controls, and reviews of standards and design processes	Extent of implementing controls	Extent of changes in controls based on system changes
	Extent of investigating factors leading to the flaws	Extent of investigating factors leading to the flaws	Extent of controls degradations	Extent of reviews, implementation of the MOC process
	Progress of taking relevant corrective actions	Progress of taking relevant corrective actions	Extent of inspection and maintenance backlog	Extent of investigating factors leading to the flaws
			Extent of reviews and updates of operating procedures	Progress of taking relevant corrective actions
			Extent of investigating factors leading to the flaws	
			Progress of taking relevant corrective actions	

4.2.3 Proposed Method

The leading indicators development process “engine” must be implemented within a structured method to ensure its effectiveness. The following proposed method can be used to assist a hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization in developing system-based process safety leading indicators.

1. Establish a team, define the scope, and identify system boundaries.
2. Collect data for system hazards, requirements, safety constraints, and risk controls, as well as for the developed control structure with responsibilities and feedback.
3. Use the leading indicators development process “engine” in conjunction with Table 4.2 to develop leading indicators that are specific for the system under study to test if the system-specific safety constraints are comprehensive, adequate, functional, and adaptable. Particular focus should be given to the following areas.
 - a. Detecting flaws (feedback): The extent to which an organization detects missing, inadequate, or degraded safety constraints.

- b. Monitoring progress (feedback): The extent to which an organization detects, addresses and corrects flaws, or (more specifically) the extent to which component responsibilities within an organization are updated based on detected flaws.
4. Screen the leading indicators to determine the most relevant and important indicators:
 - a. Based on the degree of impact they have on the system (e.g. low impact: only a single component is impacted; high impact: multiple subsystems are impacted).
 - b. Based on short term, intermediate term, and long term impacts.
 - c. Based on the sensitivity of the leading indicator.
5. Use measurable metrics for the developed leading indicators, collect data, evaluate and monitor performance, and take corrective actions when necessary.
6. Repeat Steps 3-5 periodically, and whenever there are system changes.

This proposed method is demonstrated in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3: Leading Indicators Development Method

4.2.4 Description of the Method

Step 1: Establish a team, define the scope, and identify system boundaries.

In this step, a multi-disciplinary team needs to be established, the scope needs to be defined, and system boundaries need to be defined. Input(s) and output(s) to and from the system need to be defined as well to ensure that the interactions are captured.

Step 2: Collect data for system hazards, requirements, safety constraints, and risk controls, as well as for the developed control structure with responsibilities and feedbacks.

This step can be achieved using STAMP based process hazard analysis (STPA). Refer to Section 3.1.2 for an introduction to STAMP.

System Hazards: System hazards need to be identified, which are “system states or sets of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case environment conditions, will lead to an accident (loss) [30].” The general hazards in the process industry can be defined as loss of containment events, which can lead to death or injury to people, harm to the environment, asset damage, and/or an operational/business loss. These need to be systematically identified at the different stages of the facility life cycle. More specific hazards can be developed depending on the system under study.

Particular focus should be given to loss of containment of flammable, combustible, unstable, corrosive, asphyxiating, reactive, toxic, and/or pyrophoric hydrocarbons that could result in any type of adverse consequence. The specific system hazards can be defined depending on the initial state of the hydrocarbon, ignition, wind, congestion etc. At an initial state, i.e. the source, hydrocarbons can be in the form of liquids at atmospheric pressure, pressurized liquids, or pressurized gas. Hydrocarbons can be flammable, toxic, or both. In general, consequences could be fires, explosions or flammable/toxic clouds. Process hazards are the major hazards of concern in a chemical plant, which could involve:

- Gas releases, which could result in gas dispersion of flammable and toxic material, jet fires if ignited immediately, flash fires if there is a delayed ignition, and/or vapor cloud explosions if there is a delayed ignition and a congested area;

- Liquid releases, which could result in flammable liquid pools, jet fires if aerosolized and ignited immediately, and pool fires if there is a delayed ignition;
- Two-phase releases, which can result in combinations of the scenarios described above;
- Pressurized gas vessels, which could result in Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVE) if exposed to external fires.

Safety Constraints: Risk controls need to be established, starting with the physical system and its associated control(s), and moving up in the hierarchy to other organizational, management and social aspects. Risk controls enforce safety constraints. In the process industry, the primary safety constraints at the physical level are associated with establishing the operational window, where safety constraints specify the boundaries within which the system and its subsystems must operate. These boundaries are specified based on what the system or its subsystems can withstand and on risk assessment findings. The operational window includes pressure, temperature, flow, and level specifications in which the process must be controlled. Physical controls to prevent hazards from occurring are the operational parameter controls, (pressure, temperature, etc.), alarms, shutdown system(s), and relief valves. A loss could occur if these physical controls fail to function as expected. The operational window and the associated controls are subsequently governed through the management of change procedures and updates of operational procedures.

The other main safety constraints are associated with establishing the integrity window, where safety constraints specify the minimum level of integrity required for equipment (pumps, compressors, valves, etc.), pipes, tanks, vessels, and so on. Minimum integrity levels are specified based on the metallurgy used, service, and lifetime of the unit. Maintenance, inspection, and testing procedures are used to manage integrity, and procedures are updated through the management of change procedures when changes occur.

Operations staff monitors and control the process by observing deviations and taking the necessary actions to prevent hazards from occurring. Mitigative controls such as firefighting and emergency response, although important, are not part of this research as they are reactive in nature, and the focus of this research is proactive risk management.

Control Structure: The control structure incorporates the controls and feedback needed to prevent losses. These controls need to be translated into leading indicators so that they can be monitored and corrective actions can be taken in those cases when these controls were not successful in controlling hazards. Figure 3.1 demonstrates a generic STAMP safety control structure and organizations need to have such control structure in place before developing leading indicators; this also includes organizational aspects to be taken into consideration with respect to the complexity and interactions of the system.

Step 3: Use the leading indicators development process “Engine” together with Table 4.2 to develop leading indicators

The goal of this step is to test if the system specific safety constraints are comprehensive, adequate, functional, and adaptable. Particular focus should be given to detecting flaws and monitoring progress.

To this point, the STPA should have already defined hazardous states in the system that would allow a hazard to occur (loss of containment), and the hazardous states would already have been translated into safety constraints with the safety control structure (showing feedback and controls). To detect violations of the safety constraints and hazardous states, leading indicators can be developed to detect ineffective control(s) based on STPA-based control loops. Ineffective control can result from inadequate or missing feedback, flaws in the process model, or inadequate execution of the control actions. Leading indicators can be developed using the leading indicators development process and associated supporting table, as demonstrated in the example in Section 4.3.

Step 4: Screen the leading indicators for those that are relevant and important

It is likely that when the above steps are applied, a long list of leading indicators will be found. Some of these indicators will be more important than others and monitoring them will be more effective for proactively addressing risk.

4.3 APPLYING THE METHOD - EXAMPLE

Step 1: Establish a team, define the scope, and identify system boundaries.

Consider the following example for a typical separation unit used in many chemical processing installations (Figure 4.4) to demonstrate how the safety constraints can be translated into leading indicators.




Figure 4.4: Typical Separation Unit

Step 2: Collect data for system hazards, requirements, safety constraints, and risk controls, as well as for the developed Control Structure with responsibilities and feedback.

System Hazards: In this example the hazard is defined as a loss of containment of hydrocarbons.

Safety Constraints: To prevent loss of containment, safety constraints (physical controls) for this specific example are:

SC. 1: Control the process within its design pressure, both high and vacuum;

- SC. 2: Control the process within its design temperature, both high and cryogenic;
- SC. 3: Control the flow, accumulation, and level within the design limits;
- SC. 4: Control temperature/pressure cycling within their specified ranges;
- SC. 5: Control concentrations, phase/state changes, and impurities/contamination within the design range;
- SC. 6: Control the reaction rate/heat of reaction within its safe limits;
- SC. 7: Maintain the integrity of the vessel and its associated accessories within the targets; established for corrosion, erosion, stresses, etc. allowances and within the inspection limits.

Control Structure: If we take SC.1 (overpressure) as an example, a specific STPA-based control loop can be developed as shown in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5: Separation Unit Control Loop and Causal Factors of Inadequate Control

Assumptions:

It is assumed for this example and this particular overpressure hazard that the unit would have pressure control, shutdown and relief systems, the technologies used are adequate, and that there are no changes in the system. Loss could occur if these physical controls fail to function as expected, and overpressure would result in a release of hydrocarbons. Leading indicators will be needed to detect if the controls are functional or not.

Step 3: Use the leading indicators development process “Engine” together with Table 4.2 to develop leading indicators

Ineffective control can result from inadequate or missing feedback, flaws in the process model, or inadequate execution of the control actions. It is important to highlight that the controller receives input from other internal or external components. In this example, only those coming from components in the immediate higher hierarchy are shown for illustration purposes. For each of the safety constraints and associated inadequate controls, leading indicators can be developed using the leading indicators development process and associated supporting table, as shown in Figure 4.6.

<p>Hazard: Loss of Containment</p> <p>Causes: Process Excursions: Overpressure</p> <p>Safety Constraint: System should be operated within the design allowable pressure</p> <p>High Level Requirements (Avoid Overpressure)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide control system, detection system, emergency shutdown and isolation systems, depressurizing system, relief valves, etc. • Active and passive protection systems should be provided • Systems should be maintained and inspected periodically • Risk analysis should evaluate overpressure scenarios and develop means to correct them 	<p>Inadequate Feedback</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missing feedback (e.g. unavailable data to detect pressure increase) • Incorrect feedback (e.g. calibration flaws) • Delays in feedback (e.g. maintenance, and inspection flaws) <p>Inadequate Process Model</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model <p>Inadequate Control</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control action not given (e.g. failure to shutdown, dysfunctional/unavailable control/shutdown systems) • Incorrect control action (e.g. under designed relief valve and vessel is not designed to handle maximum pressure) • Delays in taking action (e.g. due to pressures and distractions) 	<p>Leading Indicators (Monitor Process Excursions: Overpressure)</p> <p>Leading indicators are developed based on the leading indicators development process and associated supporting table. The results are shown in Table 4.3.</p>
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


Figure 4.6: Developing Leading Indicators for the Separation Unit

The previous table summarized the safety constraints, high level requirements, and inadequate controls associated with overpressure hazards. Leading indicators were developed based on the leading indicators development process and the associated supporting table (the results are shown in Table 4.3.)

Table 4.3: Leading Indicators for the Separation Unit⁷

Safety Constraint	SC1. System should be operated within the design allowable pressure	
Controller	Operator	
Inadequate Control	SC1 will not be satisfied if controls are not effective in enforcing it, which can occur if there are inadequate feedback, inadequate process model, and/or inadequate control actions.	
Leading Indicators of inadequate control: Indications that controls of overpressure are not functioning as they should.		
Inadequate feedback	<p>SC1 will not be satisfied if an increasing trend in pressure readings of the vessel is not detected, or if the pressure readings exceed the design pressure envelop without detection.</p> <p>Inadequate feedback (from the STPA-based control loop)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Unavailable data to detect pressure increases 2. There are calibration flaws in the pressure sensors 3. There are maintenance flaws in fixing faulty pressure sensors 4. There are inspection flaws in inspecting or measuring current working pressure of the vessel and its components 	<p>Flaws Detection Leading Indicators; Controller: Operator</p> <p>LI1. Number of requests made by the operator for providing pressure measurements</p> <p>LI2. Frequency of verifications of pressure sensors measurements against local actual readings</p> <p>LI3. Frequency of operations certifications of completed maintenance work</p> <p>LI4. Frequency of inspections of vessel and associated pipe wall thickness, and frequency of updates of required operating parameters</p>
Inadequate process model	<p>SC1 will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model to address an increased pressure.</p> <p>Inadequate process model (from the STPA-based control loop)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Operational procedures have incorrect or 	<p>LI5. Number of reported incorrect or missing</p>

⁷ No applicable leading indicators are identified here since it is assumed for this example and this particular overpressure hazard that the unit would have pressure control, shutdown and relief systems, the technologies used are adequate, and that there are no changes in the system. Note that if there are missing safety constraints or if inadequate constraints are used (other than those relating to controlling pressure in this example), they will be identified when a full analysis is conducted; this could highlight other problems in the overall control structure.

	<p>missing pressure set points, particularly high and critical pressures</p> <p>6. Previous increases of pressure that did not require taking actions, and did not result in any consequences</p> <p>7. Periodic reviews and updates of operational procedures are not conducted and the procedures do not address updated operational pressure envelopes</p> <p>8. Flaws in the automation system logic</p>	<p>parameters by the operator</p> <p>LI6. Number of pressure increases without the operator's action</p> <p>LI7. Frequency of updates of operational procedures and operational window parameters</p> <p>LI8. Number of reported flaws of the automation system made by the operator</p>
<p>Inadequate control actions</p>	<p>SC1 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there is a pressure increase.</p> <p>Inadequate control actions (from the STPA-based control loop)</p> <p>9. The controller fails to timely shutdown on high pressure</p> <p>10. The shutdown systems is dysfunctional</p> <p>11. The relief valves are under-designed, and/or the vessel is not designed to handle the increased pressure</p>	<p>LI9. Number of historical delays in taken action on high pressure by the operator</p> <p>LI10. Frequency of preventive maintenance of the shutdown systems</p> <p>LI11. Frequency of design re-ratings and verifications of existing protection systems</p>

Table 4.4: Additional Leading Indicators for Monitoring Progress at the Facility Level

Leading indicators for detecting dysfunctional or degraded controls at the facility level	
Rationale: Since it is important that leading indicators detect problems at the facility level, and not only on this particular system, additional leading indicators are needed. For example, if there are maintenance and/or inspection flaws at the facility level or at another unit, this is an indication that any system in the facility (including this separation unit) could be subject to these flaws.	
Inadequate feedback the facility level 12. SC1 may not be satisfied if there are overdue safety critical inspections and maintenance work orders at the facility level	LI12. Number of overdue safety critical inspections and maintenance work orders
Inadequate process models at the facility level 13. SC1 may not be satisfied if there are out of date operating procedures, and backlog in their review at the facility level	LI13. Percentage of updated operating procedures
Inadequate control actions at the facility level 14. SC1 may not be satisfied if there are a high number of process excursions at the facility level	LI14. Number of activations of alarms, shutdown system, and relief valves
Leading indicators for identifying factors resulting in the flaws and correcting these flaws at the facility level	
Rationale: If the flaws that resulted in inadequate control in the separation unit are not investigated and corrected at the system level, this is an indication that this particular system as well as others in the facility could have other incidents.	
15. SC1 may not be satisfied if the factors causing overpressure scenarios are not investigated, and/or there are a number of investigations that were not completed at the facility level	LI15. Percentage of completed investigations
16. SC1 may not be satisfied if corrective actions to address the factors that result in overpressure increases are not taken, and/or there are a number of corrective actions that are not taken	LI16. Percentage of completed actions items (resulting from investigations)

A similar analysis can be conducted for possible violations of other safety constraints associated with process excursions (e.g. temperature, level, etc.) or violations of integrity degradation constraints. These excursions can be monitored collectively rather than individually to determine if problems exist. For example, if there is a defective temperature feedback, there could also be defective pressure readings, or process monitoring in general that needs to be added to the above analysis table. This analysis could also be applied to other organizational safety constraints, depending on the specific system analyzed and the associated specific constraints and control structure(s). These analyses will vary from one system to another; thus, they will be the developed leading indicators.

5.0 SUMMARY, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION

5.1 SUMMARY

In this research, a system-based method was developed to assist a hydrocarbon/chemical processing organization in developing system-based process safety leading indicators. The purpose of this method is to assist managers and decision-makers in proactively managing risk in their organizations by identifying better means for developing leading indicators that can monitor system flaws and, thus, prevent incidents before they occur.

This research involved reviewing the literature and current practices, and defining gaps particularly in the use of a systems approach for developing leading indicators in the process industry. It was found that current guidance fall short of addressing the systemic aspects that can enable the possibility of predicting potential incidents before they occur or detecting the migration of a system to an unsafe state. Current risk management programs are either reactive (lack a forward-looking approach), or fragmented (system-based models are not used).

Since chemical processing facilities could gradually change their states from a normal state to an unsafe state if no effective controls are in place and accidents could occur due to ineffective controls, treating safety as control problem [8] is necessary. Starting with this concept, and building on safety control structures and the associated safety constraints, the proposed leading indicators development method was developed to enable detecting ineffective controls with the objective of facilitating a more systematic review that would enable a better understanding of the system, as well as the complex interactions within its subsystems, and external factors. It suggests that leading indicators can be developed by analyzing the safety controls at the different levels of the hierarchy, and the approach that can be taken is that if system safety constraints are violated and inadequate control results, then this would be an indication of ineffective control or system degradation that could lead to a loss.

To ensure that there is an effective control, it is important to have the means to proactively correct flaws in the designed control structure, and address changes in the control structure and changes in the external environment. The proposed method can be the means to achieve this. It

starts with conducting hazard analysis, and developing safety constraints, and systematically ensures that the designed control structure works and addresses all hazards and changes, or provides early warnings if the controls are not working as intended or have deteriorated over time and have become ineffective. The method facilitates the systematic review of safety constraints to ensure that controls are comprehensive, adequate, functional, and adaptable. To ensure that there is an effective control structure, the method calls for detecting flaws, ensuring the identification of factors resulting in the potential flaws, addressing the flaws at a system level, and monitoring progress.

5.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This method should be used as a tool to assist in developing leading indicators systematically, and it assumes that organizations have a risk management program in place, have already designed an organizational control structure, hazards have been identified, and associated controls have been put in place. If organizations do not have a safety control structures, and safety constraints are not developed, the method cannot be used.

Further validation, testing, and adjustment of the method can be an area of future research. The current research focused testing on its applicability on a single unit during the operational phase, and the examples were intended for demonstration purposes and are not considered comprehensive. Further validation would be needed to test its applicability when it is applied at a facility level, and when it is applied at the different phases of a facility's lifecycle. Particular focus can be given to the systematic handling of additional ineffective control, or to grouping of repeated similar leading indicators. Moreover, the method can be tested for its applicability in other industries.

Another potential area of future research is data visualization and handling of developed leading indicators. Different sets of leading indicators would be developed for each controller in the control structure, and the mechanism of transmitting and displaying relevant and important indicators to the appropriate level and relevant decision-makers based on their control responsibilities can be researched further.

Time-sensitivity and lag time between having an indication of ineffective control and the time it takes to see the impact of actions if taken to address the higher risk. Future research can address the dynamics of the system. STAMP-based modeling in this research addressed the static safety control of the system, and did not address the dynamics involved. The dynamics of the system could be analyzed so that the different reinforcing pressures, feedbacks, expectations, etc. are incorporated to get a better understanding of the dynamics of ineffective control, and, thus, having better decision-making. This will help in determining possible decisions that could have a positive impact on the safety state of the system over time and to assess whether or not these decisions reinforce safety improvement efforts. Future work can include developing such models and calibrating them based on plant-specific data.

5.3 CONCLUSION

Although current practices address process safety indicators, system-based leading indicators are not fully addressed. A more systematic way using STAMP was applied to develop leading indicators that can uncover system aspects. STAMP-based modeling can be used as a basis for developing leading indicators as it treats safety as control problem, and it addresses the systemic aspects rigorously. It helps in identifying ineffective controls, including those associated with the migration of the system towards an unsafe state, or associated with interdependencies between barriers. Using STAMP facilitated addressing leading indicators more systematically and clarified the interactions among the subsystems. The proposed method provides for the following:

- More focus on the system rather than its components;
- More careful reviews of the controls, integration, and interactions between the subsystems;
- Clearer definitions of safety-related constraints;
- Better identification and understanding of the interactions between the physical system, people, the organization, and social aspects;
- Better understanding of how inadequate controls can occur;
- Better reformulation of the problem using a system control structure;
- Uncovering more important roles of the industry and external agencies.

Using current practices may result in improved safety performance. However, better safety performance can be achieved by focusing on systems aspects. Safety indicators should garner information regarding how well the organizational functions meet the desired outcomes. Monitoring trends, taking actions, or investigating deviations should take place continuously.

6.0 DEFINITIONS

Accident: An undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily unexpected) event that results in an (unacceptable) level of loss [30].

Consequence: The outcome arising from an event. There may be one or more consequences that arise from an event. Consequences may be positive or negative. However, for the purposes of this thesis, a consequence will mean a negative outcome of any event.

Event: The occurrence of a single or multiple set of circumstances.

Failure: The nonperformance or inability of the system or component to perform its intended function for a specified time under specified environmental conditions [30].

Hazard: A state or set of conditions of a system (or an object) that, together with other conditions in the environment of the system (or object), will lead inevitably to an accident (loss event) [30].

Hazard Analysis: The identification of hazards and the assessment of hazard levels [30].

Incident: A near miss or incident is an event that involves no loss (or only minor loss) but with the potential for loss under different circumstances [30].

Process Safety: A disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating systems and processes by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating and maintenance practices [28].

Process Safety Event: An unplanned or uncontrolled LOPC of any material including non-toxic and non-flammable materials from a process, or an undesired event or condition that, under slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in a LOPC of a material [28].

Process Safety Hazards: Hazards that can result in major accidents involving the release of potentially dangerous materials [28].

Process Safety Incidents: Incidents that can have catastrophic effects such as multiple injuries and fatalities, as well as substantial economic, property, and environmental damage; can also affect workers inside the facility and members of the public who reside or work nearby [28].

Reliability: The probability that a piece of equipment or component will perform its intended function satisfactorily for a prescribed time and under stipulated environmental conditions [30].

Risk Control: The process of decision-making for reducing risk through elimination, prevention, mitigation, and treatment. It involves the implementation, enforcement and re-evaluation from time to time of the controls [45].

Risk Management: The systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of analyzing, evaluating, and controlling risk. Risk management is the coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk [45].

Safety: Freedom from accidents [30].

APPENDIX A – ACCIDENTS AND INEFFECTIVE CONTROL

This appendix provides the additional specific STPA-based control loops and the associated inadequate controls that were developed for the following system components (controllers): maintenance and inspection staff, engineering staff, and line manager for the BP Texas City Case Study discussed in Section 3.3.

A1. Maintenance and Inspection Staff

A simplified specific STPA-based control loop is shown in Figure A1, and the associated inadequate controls are listed in Table A1.




Figure A1: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Maintenance and Inspection Staff

Table A1: Inadequate Control: Maintenance and Inspection Staff

Inadequate feedback	<p>SC3 will not be satisfied if integrity degradation of the vessel is not detected. Inadequate feedback are:</p> <p>IC1. Overdue inspections and maintenance</p> <p>IC2. Incorrect inspection readings or diagnostics</p> <p>IC3. Lack of inspection and maintenance records and findings</p>
Inadequate process model	<p>SC3 will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model to address integrity degradation. Inadequate process model are:</p> <p>IC4. Incorrect or missing maintenance and inspection procedures</p> <p>IC5. Previous overdue inspections and maintenance did not result in any consequences</p> <p>IC6. Periodic reviews and updates of inspection and maintenance procedures are not conducted</p> <p>IC7. Flaws in the inspection or maintenance equipment</p> <p>\</p>
Inadequate control actions	<p>SC3 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there is integrity degradation. Inadequate control actions are:</p> <p>IC8. The controller fails to timely report or fix problems</p> <p>IC9. Faulty repairs or incorrect recommendations</p>

A2. Engineering Staff

A simplified specific STPA-based control loop is shown in Figure A2 and the associated inadequate controls are listed in Table A2.




Figure A2: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Engineering Staff

Table A2: Inadequate Control: Engineering Staff

Inadequate feedback	Safety constraints will not be satisfied if system hazards are not detected. Inadequate feedback are: IC1. Delayed risk assessments and reviews IC2. Incorrect analyses, assessments, or reviews IC3. Overlooked hazards
Inadequate process model	Safety constraints will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model to address system hazards. Inadequate process model are: IC4. Flaws in risk assessment procedures IC5. Flaws in design standards IC6. Periodic reviews and updates of procedures and standards are not conducted
Inadequate control actions	SC1 will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there are hazards identified. Inadequate control actions are:

	IC7. No recommendations to address hazards are given
	IC8. Incorrect technologies are recommended to address hazards

A3. Line Managers

A simplified specific STPA-based control loop is shown in Figure A3, and the associated inadequate controls are listed in Table A3.




Figure A3: Simple Control Structure; Controller: Line Managers

Table A3: Inadequate Control: Line Managers

Inadequate feedback	Safety constraints will not be satisfied if hazards are not timely and correctly reported. Inadequate feedback are: IC1. Delayed reports IC2. Incorrect reports
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	IC3. Missing Reports
Inadequate process model	<p>Safety constraints will not be satisfied if there are inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect process model to address reported hazards. Inadequate process model are:</p> <p>IC4. Inadequate reporting procedures</p> <p>IC5. Inadequate prioritization</p>
Inadequate control actions	<p>Safety constraints will not be satisfied if inadequate actions are taken when there are reported hazards. Inadequate control actions</p> <p>IC6. No resources or authorization given</p> <p>IC7. Incorrect decisions</p>

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